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ABSTRACT
Quantum computing has the power to break current cryptographic
systems, disrupting online banking, shopping, data storage and
communications. However, quantum mechanics can also be used to
make these systems stronger and more resilient. In this paper we
describe the transmissibility of a quantum money scheme, which
was proposed by Dmitry Gavinsky and implemented by the authors,
and discuss some of its benefits and limitations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Quantum computing has the theoretical power to break certain
modern cryptography [6]. In 1994, Peter Shor developed a quantum
algorithm that can jeopardise public key cryptographic systems [7],
such as RSA. In 1996, Grover’s algorithm was developed, which re-
duced the effectiveness of symmetric key cryptographic systems [4].
Without cryptography, much of our online banking, shopping and
data storage technology would no longer be usable.
Though quantum computing has the power to break some of
our current systems, it also holds the key to unlocking solutions
that exceed the bounds of our current computational capabilities.
Quantum technology has particularly useful qualities for applica-
tions to communication systems, privacy and security. In particular,
the ‘no-cloning’ theorem, which states that no quantum bit can
be duplicated, has been shown to have very useful properties for
quantummoney [8]. Quantummoney was one of the first suggested
applications of quantum mechanics in the realm of cryptography.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
NANOCOM ’21, September 7–9, 2021, Virtual Event, Italy
© 2021 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8710-1/21/09. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3477206.3477475
It was first proposed in 1970 by Wiesner but the idea was not ac-
cepted for publication until 1983 [8]. This first protocol, which
suggests using the basis of the quantum no-cloning theorem as a
method of creating unforgeable coins, laid the ground work for the
development of the quantum cryptography field.
In this paper, we discuss the transmissiblity of a quantum money
scheme proposed by Gavinsky [3]. This scheme allows the issu-
ing of quantum coins, which cannot be cloned and whose validity
can be verified by using local quantum operations and a classical
channel. This offers efficient coin validation while providing prov-
able security for the coin. We implemented the scheme using the
SimulaQron simulator [2]. Source code is available [5].
2 GAVINSKY’S QUANTUMMONEY
We follow much of Gavinsky’s notation. The size of the quantum
coin is 𝑘 , where each coin requires 𝑘 quantum registers (each con-
sisting of two qubits), a 𝑘 bit classical register and a unique ID.
To validate one of these coins a coin holder, say Alice, initiates
the Ver process, see Figure 1. The bank then issues a challenge
that begins by choosing a random subset of size 𝑡 of the 𝑘 registers
and the coin holder must make a measurement on 2𝑡/3 of these,
the local subset.
The details of the measurements and validation involve the use
of a quantum Hidden Matching Problem called HMP4 [1].
Gavinsky considers the trade-off between the size of 𝑡 and 𝑘 .
The larger 𝑡 is, the harder it is for an attacker to respond to the
validation challenge. However, larger 𝑡 values result in quantum
registers being used more quickly, increasing the chance that a
legitimate coin holder will be unable to respond to the challenge,
and need to have the coin re-issued. A design assumption is that
once a quarter of the quantum registers have been used, the coin
will be renewed.
Gavinsky shows that if 𝑡 is chosen to be Θ(𝑘3/4) then Ω(𝑘1/4)
validity tests will be possible. Roughly speaking, this means that
if we take 𝑡 proportional to 𝑘3/4 then the number of validations
possible will at least be proportional to 𝑘1/4.
2.1 Hidden Matching Problem
Verification is based on the Hidden Matching Problem (HMP) intro-
duced by Bar-Yossef et al. [1] and defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (HMP4 condition). For 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1}4 and 𝑚,𝑎,𝑏 ∈
{0, 1}, we say that (𝑥,𝑚, 𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ HMP4 if
𝑏 =
{
𝑥1 ⊗ 𝑥2+𝑚 if 𝑎 = 0
𝑥3−𝑚 ⊗ 𝑥4 if 𝑎 = 1
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Figure 1: Quantum Coin State Diagram
Alice provides classical bit string values (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ) to the bank
which holds the values 𝑚𝑖 . The bank verifies that Alice holds
the Q-coin corresponding to the classical values 𝑥𝑖 , by verifying
(𝑥𝑖 ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ) ∈ HMP4 for each 𝑖 in the local subset.
3 DISCUSSION
Gavinsky shows that by choosing a high value of 𝑡 , such as 𝑡 ∈
Θ(𝑘3/4), Ver can run Ω(𝑘1/4) times, where it will take 𝑒𝑘Ω (1) time
to counterfeit a Q-coin with a probability greater than 𝑒−𝑘Ω (1) . In
our tests, we initially picked 𝑡 close to 0.85𝑘3/4 and found that the
constant for the Ω lower bound on completed validations was 0.79.
Figure 2 shows how quickly our 𝑡 grows in relation to 𝑘 . There-
fore, as the coin size increases so does the number of measurements,
𝑡 , that are shared with the bank when challenged toVer. However,
the number of possible validations does not grow nearly as quickly.
Even very large Q-coins, with 𝑘 = 40,960 the number of possible
validations will be proportional to 𝑘1/4 = 8. Though, this will lead
to a very small counterfeit probability.
While it is relatively easy to achieve a strong level of security, the
Θ bound on the number of validations limits how often the coin can
be passed on and validated, which limits the transmissibility. In fact,
if we follow Gavinsky’s recommendation to re-issue the Q-coin
after 3𝑘/8𝑡 successful runs of Ver then only 1 or 2 validations can
be run. Therefore it is an option for the bank to select the level of
security that it desires. The selection of 𝑡 has an important impact
on the re-usability (or transmissibility) of the coin while considering
the effort it expends minting (issuing) and transferring the Q-coin.
If a transmissibility level of 1 is desired, i.e. to simply prove that
you are the holder of a token, then this is easy to achieve. The bank
will then need to decide an appropriate counterfeit difficulty level,
which would naturally then determine the value of 𝑘 .
Alternatively, by selecting a Q-coin that takes a smaller propor-
tion of 𝑘3/4, we would get a coin that could be validated more times
and produce a Q-coin with higher transmissibility. Suppose we take
𝑡 ≈ 𝛼𝑘3/4, where 0 < 𝛼 < 1. We get approximately 3𝑘1/4/8𝛼 valida-
tions before Gavinsky recommends re-issuing, which is a slightly
conservative lower bound. Or at most we get 3𝑘1/4/2𝛼 validations
Figure 2: Comparative growth of Ω and Θ
before register exhaustion becomes a certainty. For example, using
the maximum size we considered, 𝑘 = 512, and taking 𝛼 = 0.527 we
get 𝑡 = 54, with a maximum transmissibility level of approximately
14, or 3 before Gavinsky recommends re-issuing the Q-coin.
One of the attractive features of Gavinsky’s scheme is that the
coin does not need to be repeatedly returned to the bank, and the
coin holders do not need to have a quantum channel to the bank.
Instead they can use untrusted peers such as Bob does with Alice in
Figure 1. However, it appears that choosing parameters that allow
many validations may be challenging without storing many qubits,
making highly transmissible Q-coins a potential challenge.
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